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The Value of Security Agreements
Bernd Rudolph
Summary : The purpose of this paper is to examine security agreements in the light of some well known models of financial theory. In section 1 a survey of common credit support decision models is given and the role of collateralization is examined in the context of these models. Section 2 seeks to prove that the neoclassical theory of finance fails to explain the empirical evidence of security agreements in creditcontracts. Section 3 examines a rather new approach and it is shown on the basis of this approach that security agreements can be interpreted in a rather satisfactoring manner. Collaterals and credit covenants are realized as instruments of influencing the trustworthiness of the borrower. In sections 4 and 5 finally several types of credit contract covenants are structurized and discussed with respect to their practical efficiency. In the appendix some main results of the neoclassical approach are proved in a more general way. an approach is to be seen as a different tool to limit the creditor's commitment.
Market Uncertainty
As Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) made clear in their remarkable expository survey on the economics of uncertainty and information that the analytical decision theory has to deal with two kinds of uncertainty: the market uncertainty and the technological or event uncertainty. Although the financial literature considers almost exclusively event uncertainty, there is the remarkable exception of Milde's (1980 Milde's ( , 1981 approach which is of interest for our survey because of comprehending the phenomenon of securing debt explicity.
We discuss this approach separated from other approaches of indivi- at the end of the period, the bank will get:
If there is no doubt about the borrower's willing to repay the credit, each asset of the debtor is liable to the bank even without a claim on a collateral security, and therefore the bank will not need a collateral Y to secure the debt claim. Securities in Milde's approach define the firm's level of solvency, which is measured by the amount of net property before credit support.
Therefore the results of the model do not refer to the collateral policy of the bank, but to the bank's solvency policy specifying the minimum solvency requirements for the customer. A similar argumentation can be shown to hold for the definition of secured debt in the credit rationing approach of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) .
Credit Support Decisions with Event Uncertainty
We already mentioned that comprehending market uncertainty is the exception of the rule in credit support theory. Usually one regards event uncertainty, where an uncertainty about the future states is assumed which determine the repayment of the credit. Decision theory distinguishes between the risk situation, where the future states of the world will occur with specified given probabilities, and the gambling situation, where the states are the various acting possibilities of the opponent.
It the states of the world occur independently of the borrower's behavior, then the risk of the credit position is to be seen as the risk on the lacking credit standing of the debtor. If the states depend on the acting possibilities of the debtor, then the credit risk is a credit reliability risk. But one should assume that credit standing and credit reliability risk do not occur isolated but in combination.
The most elaborated neoclassical approach of the credit support theory considers the risk of a decreasing credit standing of the borrower exclusively. We will discuss the main models of the neoclassical approach in the next section.
Neoclassical Theory and Secured Debt

The Basic Approach
This theory assumes that a bank decides about an individual credit support at the time the customer asks for this loan. Each credit decision is made exclusively without considering the total credit engagement of the bank. The need of an individual decision is caused in default of information about the future credit demand, and by the organization of decentralized bank decisions, which is characteristic for branch bank systems (Rudolph 1974) .
The bank's decisions about credit supports depend on the net profit of the credit positions. Let us define K as the demanded loan amount, and r as the interest rate. Furtheron i is the interest rate the bank has to pay for the refinancement of its credit support.
Thus the mean of the interest excess G of a credit position will be where a is the mean credit repayment quota. For a =1 the bank expects the repayment at the end of the period with certainty, for a <1 the bank expects with a certain probability which among others depends on the interest rate r and on the credit amount K that the credit will not be paid back in the whole amount. 
Secured Debt and Capital Market Equilibrium
The theory of capital market equilibrium investigates among others whether a shift of default risks from one creditor to other creditors can cause any advantages for the debtor. In a corporation with outstanding debt these advantages would result in a rise of the market value of the debt and therefore in an increased market value of the firm.
If the creditors act rationally and on the presumptions usually summarized for the assumption of a perfect capital market one can
show that the collateral policy of a levered firm is irrelevant for its market value. One could call this statement analogous to the irrelevance hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller (1958) Consider now bank A insisting on a collateral to secure its credit.
The debt contract is secured if the firm pledges the asset X or Y or both assets to the bank with the provision that should the firm default the bank has the right to seize and sell the collateralized asset. Should the proceeds from the sale exceed the outstanding amount, the excess is returned to the firm. If the proceeds are insufficient to meet the outstanding amount, the bank retains all of the proceeds and becomes an unsecured creditor for the remaining debt. The value of the total debt, which is F = 47 + 47 = 94 without collateral, does not change with securing the debt position of bank A .
The claim A's value gains 3 units, but this rise is exactly compensated for by the 3 units decrease of the value of claim B .
Collateral Policy and Non-Market-Value Debt Claims
Contrary to the just discussed collateral irrelevance hypothesis Scott (1977) has shown that a firm can maximize its value when it uses all its assets as collateral for the creditors. Scott is arguing that in the case of the debtor's default some debt has to be paid before distributing the bankruptcy estate to the creditors.
These costs are especially sales taxes, property taxes, excise taxes, the administrative costs of bankruptcy and legal damages claims. Presumed furtheron a default free interest rate of 10 % and a risk neutral capital market, the value of the debt claims is • On a perfect and complete capital market the collateral policy of a firm is irrelevant for its market value (collateral irrelevance hypothesis).
• Considering insufficiencies of the capital market, i.e. market exogenous claims on the corporate's securities, a collateral policy shifting the utmost risk from the market creditors to the non-market creditors will cause the maximum market value of the firm (fully collateral policy).
We are not satisfied with these results of the neoclassical theory:
Although securing debt causes high private and public costs (monitoring costs, contract costs, administrative costs, law costs etc.) this instrument is s t i l l of great importance on real financial markets. The neoclassical theory can explain this discrepancy only with the total collateral policy. But on real capital markets full collaterization is rather the exception than the rule.
On the other hand it is not unusual that debt contracts imply collateral-agreements even if the covenantee presumptively is and remains the sole creditor, so that in this case a risk transfer to other creditors is of no importance because secured and unsecured credit positions are equivalent.
Including the reasoning of the economics of information in the neoclassical theory of credit support decisions will disclose us a theoretical base to explain the practice of collateralization in creditor/debtor relations. But notice that the ideas of the economics of information are to complete our previous thoughts in such a way that deciding about credit support the bank has to consider the risk of credit standing and of credit reliability combined.
To concrete the idea of the economics of information in this context i t is useful to investigate in the first stage the isolated risk of credit reliability. It will be shown that collateral can bound or even eliminate that risk. In the next section we will examine the situation where both risks have to be considered conjointly.
The well known model of Jaffee and Russell (1976) is a first approach to investigate the isolated risk of credit reliability. The topic of the model is the phenomenon of credit rationing: "Credit rationing occurs when lenders quote an interest rate on loans and then proceed to supply a smaller loan size than that demanded by the borrowers".
The neoclassical solution of this gap proposes that the unsatisfied borrowers will offer a higher interest rate, which will motivate the bank to rise the loan supply for an increased risk premium; this process finally will end when credit supply and demand are in equilibrium at a certain interest rate.
Credit rationing is an instrument of the banks to influence the average solidity of their customership. A decrease of the mean credit supply can reduce the number of "dishonest" debtors, because the incentive to breach the contract is smaller if it is â paltry credit amount. Therefore credit reliability is not a permanent (fixed) unchangeable condition of the borrower, but a consequence of an economical reasoning.
The borrower will f u l f i l l the contract (i.e. repay the loan) if it is economical advantageous and on the other side he will breach the contract if this behavior is profitable. Through its debt-policy the bank can influence the lucrativeness of repayment for the debtor. If not paying involves certain costs for the borrower (cost to default) the bank can reduce the numbers of borrowers which have an advantage if they fail to repay. These costs are given exogenously in the Jaffee and Russell model, whereas the exogenously given amount can be different for each borrower.
In contrast to this assumption of an exogenous cost factor Rudolph (1982) showed the ability of the banks to influence the cost of default. Banks could especially increase these costs if they enclose collateral convenants in loan contracts so that in case of the borrower's nonpayment he will lose part of his securities to the bank. Collaterals therefore can increase the probability of repayment.
With the inclusion of collateral in the model of Jaffee and Russell one gets a common price equilibrium instead of the rationing equilibrium, because with a given credit standing of the borrower the repayment of the loan is only a question of the debtor's will.
Since the assumption of a given credit standing is not realistic, we have to examine in the next section the decisions of a bank in the face of a credit standing risk and a credit reliability risk. We will discuss the problems of this situation with the help of our former numerical example.
Contemporaneous Examination of Credit Standing Risk and Credit
Reliability Risk
Let us take again the probability distributions of X and Y , as shown in table 1 to demonstrate the simultaneous analysis of the credit-standing and credit-reliability risk of a firm. The distributions determine the debtor's credit standing for given loan quantities .
The credit reliability risk on the other hand is to be seen in the fact that the creditor does not know whether the firm will keep the assets with the liquidation proceeds X and Y until the end of the period to serve the bank's receivables or if the firm sells the assets and disposes of the proceeds in another way. Creditors are faced with uncertain expectations which of the alternatively possible plans of the firm will be realized after the credit is placed at the firm's disposition. Swoboda (1975) calls these risks as distribution risks: "We'll call the risk that a position of a creditor alters caused by subsequent decisions of the firm distribution risk" (as e.g. issuing additional debt which will dilute the claim of the original creditor). Later on several articles of the financial literature focused on this problem and summarized the main post-credit strategies of debtors Warner 1979b,Smith 1980 ). We will discuss these strategies based on the numerical example of table 1 and examine whether creditors could diminish the distribution risk with the help of collateral.
Changing the Dividend Policy
After the issue of the credit, the firm can raise its dividend rate, in spite of a former declared lower rate, and thus increase the default risk for the creditors. The dividend payments can be financed by reduced investment (balance sheet cut) or financed by issuing additional debt (change of liabilities).
Dividend payments evoke a higher risk for the initial creditor, because liable capital (equity) is substituted by unliable capital (debt).
Let us consider the firm of our example adding a new loan with a receivable of T c = 22 in t = 1 to its senior debt (with receivables of T A = 5 5 and T ß = 55 ) .
After the additional loan is issued, the market value of the whole debt will be If the senior debt is fully secured and the firm issues junior debt with the principal of T c = 22 , its value will be:
If the firm gets the disposal of this loan quantity and pays it instantly to the equity owners, the claims of the creditors A and B are not diluted. Since their debt is secured, they are protected against distribution risks caused by credit financed dividend payments to the equity owners.
As far as it concerns dividend payments by desinvestment (balance sheet cut), they too can be prevented by securing the debt. Secured debt gives the creditor the exploitation right on the security such that the management of the firm cannot arbitrarily dispose of the asset. Therefore the possibility of a dividend payment, financed with proceeds of sold assets, is reduced.
However, a total prevention of desinvestment financed payments is rather impossible. Creditors would have to use all the firm's assets as collateral to transfer the right to dispose over the firm's estate totally from the management to the lenders. S t i l l , by securing debt, one can install upper bounds for dividend payments and protect those assets which may not be sold in order to use the proceeds for dividend payments (real estate, notworking assets).
Changing the Credit Policy
The levered firm can repay its debt to some creditors premature or it can secure some creditor's debt. Both policies are disadvantageous for the other creditors because their claims' value decreases. In the case of a premature repayment all the risk is transferred to the residual debt, while in the case of secured debt the amount of shifted risk from secured to unsecured debt depends on the quality of the collateral. Creditors with contracts including collateral covenants usually do not have to fear these forms of the distribution risk.
Changing the Investment Policy
Finally the firm has a third opportunity to transfer risk investing in projects with higher risk than declared to the creditors. Such an altered investment policy can increase the value of equity, because although the default risk rises, the firm realizes higher yields for the benefit of the shareholders in default-free states (Swoboda 1982 Collateral can be seen as a tool to prevent (or limit) distribution risk, caused by a change of investment policy, because the investment policy of the firm would be determined if bank A or B put the security with the yield X in pledge.
To prevent an investment policy change, it would even be sufficient in this case, that one of the creditors put pledge on asset X .
Conditional of the given credit reliability risk, securing one bank's debt will also improve the unsecured claim, because the raised default risk, which the unsecured creditor has to face after the other creditors claim, can be more than compensated by the reduction of the credit reliability risk.
To prove these market value rising effects of collateral, we will presume that banks A and B expect with an a priori probability of 50% the realization of plan x or z . In this case the debt's value will be One can ascertain that securing debt with pledged assets is a rather strong policy to influence the behavior of the equity owners. Credit markets have developed also other and weaker instruments to lower the risk-shifting possibilities of the corporation. These strategies are documented in the several types of credit contract covenants in figure 2. Credit contract covenants are provisions included in debt contracts which either endow the creditors with special rights or bind the debtors to special obligations. These covenants in contrast to guarantee-or collateral-agreements, refer only indirectly to means of payment by influencing the probability distributions which determine the amount of repayment of the debtor.
Before discussing the cases in which the lenders should use the stronger or the weaker policy to control the debtor's behavior, we will give a short survey of the different types of covenants.
Covenants Referring Indirectly to Means of Payment
Special Obligations of the Debtors
Special obligations are duties which are not generally requested by the codes of civil law. A firm,for example, can be obliged to supply financial and other information for the credit period. The information about the economic status of the firm can be general (balance sheets, financial statements, reports etc.) or refer to special situations as changes in mortgage rights or in management. Additionally/the borrower can bind himself to obtain certain balance sheet relations, liquidity ratios or capital structure relations as long as the debt is outstanding.
Of great importance are the so called 'me first' rules. By including a me first rule in his debt contract a creditor wants to protect his position against dilution, which can be evoked if the firm issues additional debt. We can differ between three types of me first rules
• The debtor can assure that he will not issue debt with a higher priority or doing so the existing debt will be upgraded (deptpriority-equality).
• Secured debt is often endowed with the obligation of the debtor that the will not sell, lease or pawn the security, with other words, the debtor 'reserves' the pledged asset to the creditor.
• The most restrictive type of me first rules binds the debtor not to sell, lease or pawn his assets, not to secure any other debt, or in the extreme case even not to issue any additional debt at all.
This last type leads us to a group of restrictions which binds the debtor to a specific maintenance of this assets. These obligations include for example the duty to treat real estate, machines or raw material in an orderly manner, or to insure these items. All these provisions interfere with the real-sphere of the firm and usually generate costs.
Special Rights of the Creditors
According to the special duties of the debtors we will first refer to the information rights of the lenders which are not installed in On the commercial credit market, where longterm creditor/debtor relations are ascertainable, one can observe collateralization and nonpecuniary covenants to regulate the behavior of the debtor.
Actually these nonpecuniary covenants are extremely important (as me first rules). Concerning smaller firms, collateralization is regular, whereas the crediting banks request especially real estate as securities.
If firms issue only small loan quantities and are relatively unknown to the crediting bank (because the credit contract is the sole relation between customer and bank) the bank will secure its debt with collateral-agreements to influence (although indirectly) the firm's business policy during the period of credit. In this case, collateral is an efficient and cheap instrument of debtor's self binding, which can save the creditor/debtor relation costly planning-and monitoring costs (Drukarczyk 1983 (Drukarczyk , 1984 . 
T
Since the shareholders have claim on the firm's assets minus the sum of liabilities in t=1 , and because of the limited liability of common stock, the value of the equity will be: 
6.2 Derivation of the Value of Secured Debt Let us assume now that bank A gets the asset with the market value X as a collateral for its credit. In the case of default A has a claim on the asset with value X ; thus the market value of bank A's receivable is:
The first sum of (8) considers that if the firm does not default A will get the entire amount of its receivable T^ , while the second sum of (8) 
{^<Y-U>,o}
The first sum of equation (9) shows that A will get the whole amount of its receivable if the firm does not default (s=1,2,..., k-1) , or if default does occur, the liquidation proceeds of the collateral are sufficient to pay T A completely (s=k,k+1,...,1-1) .
The second sum includes the present value of bankrupt's estate if the receivable T A exceeds the yields of the collateral. In this case the bank will get the value X of the collateral and its part of the redundancy Y-U , if this margin is positive.
Comparing equation (9) to (4), whereas equation (4) values the unsecured credit of A , and (9) the secured claim, one can see that collateralization
• has raised the probability of a total repayment to bank A , unless none of the states s= (k,k+1 , . . . , 1-1 ) occurs.
• has diminished the amount of an eventual lack of payment to bank A , unless X = 0 holds for s= ( 1,1+1 , . . . , s) .
If one excludes the extreme case where X=0 holds for s= (k,k+1, ....,s) , the market value of the secured debt quantified by (9) not only the value of its receivable but also the market value of the debt, the market value of the firm can also be increased. To prove these relations, we will first inspect the interdependency of the value of bank A's receivable with the collateralization of its debt.
We can express the value of the unsecured debt by: 
s=l s=k and therefore
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